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Abstract
We present a private learner for halfspaces over an arbitrary finite domain X ⊂ Rd with sample com-
plexity poly(d,2log
∗ |X |). The building block for this learner is a differentially private algorithm for locating
an approximate center point of m > poly(d,2log
∗ |X |) points – a high dimensional generalization of the me-
dian function. Our construction establishes a relationship between these two problems that is reminiscent
of the relation between the median and learning one-dimensional thresholds [Bun et al. FOCS ’15]. This
relationship suggests that the problem of privately locating a center point may have further applications
in the design of differentially private algorithms.
We also provide a lower bound on the sample complexity for privately finding a point in the convex
hull. For approximate differential privacy, we show a lower bound of m =Ω(d + log∗ |X |), whereas for pure
differential privacym =Ω(d log |X |).
1 Introduction
Machine learning models are often trained on sensitive personal information, e.g., when analyzing health-
care records or social media data. There is hence an increasing awareness and demand for privacy pre-
serving machine learning technology. This motivated the line of works on private learning, initiated by
Kasiviswanathan et al. [2011], which provides strong (mathematically proven) privacy protections for the
training data. Specifically, these works aim at achieving differential privacy, a strong notion of privacy that
is now increasingly being adopted by both academic researchers and industrial companies. Intuitively, a
private learner is a PAC learner that guarantees that every single example has almost no effect on the result-
ing classifier. Formally, a private learner is a PAC learner that satisfies differential privacy w.r.t. its training
data. The definition of differential privacy is,
Definition 1.1 (Dwork et al. [2006b]). Let A be a randomized algorithm that operates on databases. Algo-
rithm A is (ε,δ)-differentially private if for any two databases S,S ′ that differ on one row, and any event T ,
we have Pr[A(S) ∈ T ] ≤ eε ·Pr[A(S ′) ∈ T ]+δ. The notion is referred to as pure differential privacy when δ = 0,
and approximate differential privacy when δ > 0.
The initial work of Kasiviswanathan et al. [2011] showed that any concept class C is privately learnable
with sample complexity O(log |C |) (we omit in the introduction the dependencies on accuracy and privacy
parameters). Non-privately, Θ(VC(C)) samples are necessary and sufficient to PAC learn C, and much
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research has been devoted to understanding how large the gap is between the sample complexity of pri-
vate and non-private PAC learners. For pure differential privacy, it is known that a sample complexity of
Θ(log |C |) is required even for learning some simple concept classes such as one-dimensional thresholds,
axis-aligned rectangles, balls, and halfspaces [Beimel et al., 2014, 2013a, Feldman and Xiao, 2015]. That is,
generally speaking, learning with pure differential privacy requires sample complexity proportional to log
the size of the hypothesis class. For example, in order to learn halfspaces in Rd , one must consider some
finite discretization of the problem, e.g. by assuming that input examples come from a finite set X ⊆ Rd .
A halfspace over X is represented using d point from X, and hence, learning halfspaces over X with pure
differential privacy requires sample complexity Θ(log
(|X |
d
)
) = O(d log |X |). In contrast, learning halfspaces
non-privately requires sample complexity O(d). In particular, when the dimension d is constant, learning
halfspaces non-privately is achieved with constant sample complexity, while learning with pure differential
privacy requires sample complexity that is proportional to the representation length of domain elements.
For approximate differential privacy, the current understanding is more limited. Recent results estab-
lished that the class of one-dimensional thresholds over a domain X ⊆ R requires sample complexity be-
tween Ω(log∗ |X |) and 2O(log∗ |X |) (Beimel et al. [2013b], Bun et al. [2015], Bun [2016], Alon et al. [2018]). On
the one hand, these results establish a separation between what can be learned with or without privacy, as
they imply that privately learning one-dimensional thresholds over an infinite domain is impossible. On
the other hand, these results show that, unlike with pure differential privacy, the sample complexity of
learning one-dimensional thresholds can be much smaller than log |C | = log |X |. Beimel et al. [2013b] also
established an upper bound of poly(d · 2log∗ |X |) for privately learning the class of axis-aligned rectangles
over X ⊆ Rd . In a nutshell, this concludes our current understanding of the sample complexity of approx-
imate private learning. In particular, before this work, it was not known whether similar upper bounds
(that grow slower than log |C |) can be established for “richer” concept classes, such as halfspaces, balls, and
polynomials.
We answer this question positively, focusing on privately learning halfspaces. The class of halfspaces
forms an important primitive in machine learning as learning halfspaces implies learning many other con-
cept classes (Ben-David and Litman [1998]). In particular, it is the basis of popular algorithms such as
neural nets and kernel machines, as well as various geometric classes (e.g., polynomial threshold functions,
polytopes, and d-dimensional balls).
1.1 Our Results
Our approach for privately learning halfspaces is based on a reduction to the task of privately finding a
point in the convex hull of a given input dataset. That is, towards privately learning halfspaces we first
design a sample-efficient differentially private algorithm for identifying a point in the convex hull of the
given data, and then we show how to use such an algorithm for privately learning halfspaces.
Privately finding a point in the convex hull. We initiate the study of privately finding a point in the con-
vex hull of a dataset S ⊆ X ⊆ Rd . Even though this is a very natural problem (with important applications,
in particular to learning halfspaces), it has not been considered before in the literature of differential pri-
vacy. One might try to solve this problem using the exponential mechanism of McSherry and Talwar [2007],
which, given a dataset and a quality function, privately identifies a point with approximately maximum
quality. To that end, one must first settle on a suitable quality function such that if a point x ∈ X has a high
quality then this point is guaranteed to be in the convex hull of S. Note that the indicator function q(x) = 1
if and only if x is in the convex hull of S is not a good option, as every point x ∈ X has quality either 0 or
1, and the exponential mechanism only guarantees a solution with approximately maximum quality (with
additive error larger than 1).
Our approach is based on the concept of Tukey-depth [Tukey, 1975]. Given a dataset S ⊆ Rd , a point
x ∈ Rd has the Tukey-depth at most ℓ if there exists a set A ⊆ S of size ℓ such that x is not in the convex
hull of S \ A. See Section 2.5 for an equivalent definition that has a geometric flavor. Instantiating the
exponential mechanism with the Tukey-depth as the quality function results in a private algorithm for
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identifying a point in the convex hull of a dataset S ⊆ X ⊆ Rd with sample complexity poly(d, log |X |).1 We
show that this upper bound can be improved to poly(d,2log
∗ |X |). Our construction utilizes an algorithm
by Beimel et al. [2013b] for approximately maximizing (one-dimensional) quasi-concave functions with
differential privacy (see Definition 2.9 for quasi-concavity). To that end, we show that it is possible to
find a point with high Tukey-depth in iterations over the axes, and show that the appropriate functions
are indeed quasi-concave. This allows us to instantiate the algorithm of Beimel et al. [2013b] to identify a
point in the convex hull of the dataset one coordinate at a time. We obtain the following theorem.
Theorem 1.2 (Informal). Let ε ≤ 1 and δ < 1/2 and let X ⊂ Rd . There exists an (ε,δ)-differentially private
algorithm that given a dataset S ∈ Xm identifies (w.h.p.) a point in the convex hull of S, provided that m = |S | =
poly
(
d,2log
∗ |X |, 1ε , log
1
δ
)
.
In fact, our algorithm returns a point with a large Tukey-depth, which is in particular a point in the
convex hull of the dataset. This fact will be utilized by our reduction from learning halfspaces, and will
allow us to get improved sample complexity bounds on privately learning halfspaces.
A privacy preserving reduction from halfspaces to convex hull. Our reduction can be thought of as
a generalization of the results by Bun et al. [2015], who showed that the task of privately learning one-
dimensional thresholds is equivalent to the task of privately solving the interior point problem. In this prob-
lem, given a set of input numbers, the task is to identify a number between the minimal and the maximal
input numbers. Indeed, this is exactly the one dimensional version of the convex-hull problem we con-
sider. However, the reduction of Bun et al. [2015] does not apply for halfspaces, and we needed to design a
different reduction.
Our reduction is based on the sample and aggregate paradigm: assume a differentially private algo-
rithm A which gets a (sufficiently large) dataset D ⊂ Rd and returns a point in the convex hull of D. This
can be used to privately learn halfspaces as follows. Given an input sample S, partition it to sufficiently
many subsamples S1, . . . ,Sk , and pick for each Si an arbitrary halfspace hi which is consistent with Si . Next,
apply A to privately find a point in the convex hull of the hi ’s (to this end represent each hi as a point
in Rd+1 via its normal vector and bias), and output the halfspace h corresponding to the returned point.
It can be shown that if each of the hi ’s has a sufficiently low generalization error, which is true if the sam-
ple is big enough, then the resulting (privately computed) halfspace also has a low generalization error.
Instantiating this reduction with our algorithm for the convex hull we get the following theorem.
Theorem 1.3 (Informal). Let ε ≤ 1 and δ < 1/2 and let X ⊂ Rd . There exists an (ε,δ)-differentially private
(α,β)-PAC learner for halfspaces over examples from X with sample complexity m = poly
(
d,2log
∗ |X |, 1αε , log
1
βδ
)
.
In particular, for any constant d, Theorem 1.3 gives a private learner for halfspaces over X ⊆ Rd with
sample complexity 2O(log
∗ |X |). Before our work, this was known only for d = 1.
A lower bound for finding a point in the convex hull. Without privacy considerations, finding a point in
the convex hull of the data is trivial. Nevertheless, we show that any (ε,δ)-differentially private algorithm
for this task (in d dimensions) must have sample complexity m = Ω(dε log
1
δ + log
∗ |X |). In comparison, our
algorithm requires sample of size at least O˜(d2.52O(log
∗ |X |)/ǫ) (ignoring the dependency on δ and β).
Recall that the sample complexity of privately learning a class C is always at most O(log |C |). Hence, it
might be tempting to guess that a sample complexity of m = O(log |X |) should suffice for privately finding
a point in the convex hull of a dataset S ⊆ X ⊆ Rd , even with pure (ε,0)-differential privacy. We show that
this is not the case, and that any pure (ε,0)-differentially private algorithm for this task must have sample
complexity m =Ω(dε log |X |).
1We remark that the domain X does not necessarily contain a point with a high Tukey-depth, even when the input points come
from X ⊆ Rd . Hence, one must first extend the domain X to make sure that a good solution exists. This results in a private algorithm
with sample complexity O(d3 log |X |).
3
1.2 Other Related Work
Most related to our work is the work on private learning and its sample and time complexity by Blum et al.
[2005], Kasiviswanathan et al. [2011], Blum et al. [2005], Beimel et al. [2014], Chaudhuri and Hsu [2011],
Beimel et al. [2013a], Feldman and Xiao [2015], Beimel et al. [2013b], Bun et al. [2015], Bun and Zhandry
[2016]. As some of these works demonstrate efficiency gaps between private and non-private learning,
alternative models have been explored including semi-supervised learning (Beimel et al. [2015]), learning
multiple concepts (Bun et al. [2016]), and prediction (Dwork and Feldman [2018], Bassily et al. [2018]).
Dunagan and Vempala [2008] showed an efficient (non-private) learner for halfspaces that works in (a
variant of) the statistical query (SQ) model of Kearns [1998]. It is known that SQ learners can be trans-
formed to preserve differential privacy [Blum et al., 2005], and the algorithm of Dunagan and Vempala
[2008] yields a differentially private efficient learner for halfspaces over examples fromX ⊆ Rd with sample
complexity poly(d, log |X |). Another related work is that of Hsu et al. [2014] who constructed an algorithm
for approximately solving linear programs with differential privacy. While learning halfspaces non-privately
easily reduces to solving linear programs, it is not clear whether the results of Hsu et al. [2014] imply a
private learner for halfspaces (due to the types of errors they incur).
2 Preliminaries
In this section we introduce a tool that enables our constructions, describe the geometric object we use
throughout the paper, and present some of their properties.
Notations. The input of our algorithm is a multiset S whose elements are taken (possibly with repetition)
from a set X. We will abuse notation and write that S ⊆ X. Databases S1 and S2 are called neighboring if
they differ in exactly one entry. Throughout this paper we use ε and δ for the privacy parameters, α for the
error parameter, and β for the confidence parameter, andm for the sample size. In this appendix we define
differentially private algorithms and the PAC learning model.
2.1 Preliminaries from Differential Privacy
Consider a database where each record contains information of an individual. An algorithm is said to
preserve differential privacy if a change of a single record of the database (i.e., information of an individual)
does not significantly change the output distribution of the algorithm. Intuitively, this means that the
information infer about an individual from the output of a differentially-private algorithm is similar to
the information that would be inferred had the individual’s record been arbitrarily modified or removed.
Formally:
Definition 2.1 (Differential privacy [Dwork et al., 2006b,a]). A randomized algorithmA is (ε,δ)-differentially
private if for all neighboring databases S1,S2 ∈ Xm, and for all sets F of outputs,
Pr[A(S1) ∈ F ] ≤ exp(ε) ·Pr[A(S2) ∈ F ] + δ, (1)
where the probability is taken over the random coins of A. When δ = 0 we omit it and say that A preserves
ε-differential privacy.
We use the term pure differential privacy when δ = 0 and the term approximate differential privacy when
δ > 0, in which case δ is typically a negligible function of the database size m.
We will later present algorithms that access their input database using (several) differentially private
algorithms. We will use the following composition theorems.
Theorem 2.2 (Basic composition). If A1 and A2 satisfy (ε1,δ1) and (ε2,δ2) differential privacy, respectively,
then their concatenation A(S) = 〈A1(S),A2(S)〉 satisfies (ε1 + ε2,δ1 + δ2)-differential privacy.
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Moreover, a similar theorem holds for the adaptive case, where an algorithm uses k adaptively chosen
differentially private algorithms (that is, when the choice of the next differentially private algorithm that is
used depends on the outputs of the previous differentially private algorithms).
Theorem 2.3 ([Dwork et al., 2006a, Dwork and Lei, 2009]). An algorithm that adaptively uses k algorithms
that preserves (ε/k,δ/k)-differential privacy (and does not access the database otherwise) ensures (ε,δ)-differential
privacy.
Note that the privacy guaranties of the above bound deteriorates linearly with the number of interac-
tions. By bounding the expected privacy loss in each interaction (as opposed to worst-case), Dwork et al.
[2010] showed the following stronger composition theorem, where privacy deteriorates (roughly) as
√
kε +
kε2 (rather than kε).
Theorem 2.4 (Advanced composition Dwork et al. [2010], restated). Let 0 < ε0,δ
′ ≤ 1, and let δ0 ∈ [0,1]. An
algorithm that adaptively uses k algorithms that preserves (ε0,δ0)-differential privacy (and does not access the
database otherwise) ensures (ε,δ)-differential privacy, where ε =
√
2k ln(1/δ′) · ε0 +2kε20 and δ = kδ0 + δ′.
2.2 Preliminaries from Learning Theory
We next define the probably approximately correct (PAC) model of Valiant [1984]. A concept c : X → {0,1}
is a predicate that labels examples taken from the domain X by either 0 or 1. A concept class C over X is a set
of concepts (predicates) mapping X to {0,1}. A learning algorithm is given examples sampled according to
an unknown probability distribution D over X, and labeled according to an unknown target concept c ∈ C.
The learning algorithm is successful when it outputs a hypothesis h that approximates the target concept
over samples from D. More formally:
Definition 2.5. The generalization error of a hypothesis h : X → {0,1} is defined as
errorD(c,h) = Pr
x∼D
[h(x) , c(x)].
If errorD(c,h) ≤ α we say that h is α-good for c and D.
Definition 2.6 (PAC Learning [Valiant, 1984]). Algorithm A is an (α,β,m)-PAC learner for a concept class
C over X using hypothesis class H if for all concepts c ∈ C, all distributions D on X, given an input of
m samples S = (z1, . . . , zm), where zi = (xi , c(xi )) and each xi is drawn i.i.d. from D, algorithm A outputs a
hypothesis h ∈H satisfying
Pr[errorD(c,h) ≤ α] ≥ 1− β,
where the probability is taken over the random choice of the examples in S according to D and the random
coins of the learner A. If H ⊆ C then A is called a proper PAC learner; otherwise, it is called an improper
PAC learner.
Definition 2.7. For a labeled sample S = (xi ,yi )
m
i=1, the empirical error of h is
errorS (h) =
1
m
|{i : h(xi ) , yi }|.
2.3 Private Learning
Consider a learning algorithm A in the probably approximately correct (PAC) model of Valiant [1984]. We
say that A is a private learner if it also satisfies differential privacy w.r.t. its training data. Formally,
Definition 2.8 (Private PAC Learning [Kasiviswanathan et al., 2011]). Let A be an algorithm that gets an
input S = (z1, . . . , zm), where each zi is a labeled example. Algorithm A is an (ε,δ)-differentially private (α,β)-
PAC learner with sample complexity m for a concept class C over X using hypothesis class H if
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Privacy. Algorithm A is (ε,δ)-differentially private (as in Definition 2.1);
Utility. Algorithm A is an (α,β)-PAC learner for C with sample complexity m using hypothesis class H
(as in Definition 2.6).
Note that the utility requirement in the above definition is an average-case requirement, as the learner
is only required to do well on typical samples (i.e., samples drawn i.i.d. from a distribution D and correctly
labeled by a target concept c ∈ C). In contrast, the privacy requirement is a worst-case requirement, which
must hold for every pair of neighboring databases (no matter how they were generated, even if they are not
consistent with any concept in C).
2.4 A Private Algorithm for Optimizing Quasi-concave Functions –ARecConcave
We next describe properties of an algorithm ARecConcave of Beimel et al. [2016]. This algorithm is given
a quasi-concave function Q (defined below) and privately finds a point x such that Q(x) is close to its
maximum provided that the maximum of Q(x) is large enough (see (2)).
Definition 2.9. A function Q(·) is quasi-concave if Q(ℓ) ≥min {Q(i),Q(j)} for every i < ℓ < j .
Definition 2.10 (Sensitivity). The sensitivity of a function f : Xm → R is the smallest k such that for every
neighboring D,D′ ∈ Xm, we have |f (D)− f (D′)| ≤ k.
Proposition 2.11 (Properties of Algorithm ARecConcave [Beimel et al., 2016]). Let Q : X∗ × X˜ → R be a
sensitivity-1 function (that is, for every x ∈ X˜, the function Q(·,x) has sensitivity 1). Denote T˜ = |X˜| and let
α ≤ 12 and β,ε,δ,r be parameters. There exits an (ε,δ)-differentially private algorithm, called ARecConcave, such
that the following holds. If ARecConcave is executed on a database S ∈ X∗ such that Q(S, ·) is quasi-concave and in
addition
max
i∈X˜
{Q(S, i)} ≥ r ≥ 8log∗ T˜ · 12log
∗ T˜
αε
log
(192(log∗ T˜ )2
βδ
)
, (2)
then with probability at least 1− β the algorithm outputs an index j s.t. Q(S,j) ≥ (1−α)r.
Claim 2.12. Let {ft}t∈T be a finite family of quasi-concave functions. Then, f (x) = mint∈T ft(x) is also quasi-
concave.
Proof. Let i ≤ ℓ ≤ j . Then,
f (ℓ) = min
t∈T
ft(ℓ)
≥min
t∈T
{min{ft(i), ft (j)}} (ft is quasi-concave, ∀t ∈ T )
= min{min
t∈T
ft(i),min
t∈T
ft(j)}
=min{f (i), f (j)}.
2.5 Halfspaces, Convex Hull, and Tukey Depth
We next define the geometric objects we use in this paper.
Definition 2.13 (Halfspaces andHyperplanes). LetX ⊂ Rd . For a1, . . . ,ad ,w ∈ R, let the halfspace hsa1,...,ad ,w :
X → {0,1} be defined as hsa1,...,ad ,w(x1, . . . ,xd ) = 1 if and only if
∑d
i=1 aixi ≥ w. Define the concept class
HALFSPACE(X) = {hsa1,...,ad ,w}a1,...,ad ,w∈R. We say that a halfspace hs contains a point x ∈ Rd if hs(x) = 1. The
hyperplane hpa1,...,ad ,w defined by a1, . . . ,ad ,w is the set of all points x = (x1, . . . ,xd ) such that
∑d
i=1 aixi = w.
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Definition 2.14. Let S ⊂ Rd be a finite multiset of points. A point x ∈ Rd is in the convex hull of S if x
is a convex combination of the elements of S, that is, there exists non-negative numbers
{
ay
}
y∈S such that∑
y∈S ay = 1 and
∑
y∈S ayy = x.
We next define the Tukey median of a point, which is a generalization of a median to Rd .
Definition 2.15 (Tukey depth [Tukey, 1975]). Let S ⊂ Rd be a finite multiset of points. The Tukey depth
of a point x ∈ Rd with respect to S, denoted by td(x), is the minimum number of points in S contained in a
halfspace containing the point x, that is,
td(x) = min
hs∈HALFSPACEd,T ,hs(x)=1
| {y ∈ S : hs(y) = 1} |.
The Tukey median of S is a point maximizing the Tukey depth. A centerpoint is a point of depth at
least |S |/(d +1).
Observation 2.16. The Tukey depth of a point is a sensitivity one function of the multiset S.
Claim 2.17 (Tukey depth, alternative definition). Let S ⊂ Rd be a multiset of points. For a given a1, . . . ,ad ∈ R
define the function
ta1,...,ad (w) ,min

∣∣∣∣∣∣∣{(y1, . . . ,yd ) ∈ S :
d∑
i=1
aiyi ≥ w}
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣ ,
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣{(y1, . . . ,yd ) ∈ S :
d∑
i=1
aiyi ≤ w}
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
 . (3)
Then,
td(x1, . . . ,xn) = min
(a1,...,ad )∈R
ta1,...,ad

d∑
i=1
aixi
 . (4)
Claim 2.18 (Tukey depth, another alternative definition). Let S ⊂ Rd be a multiset of points. The Tukey-depth
of a point x is the size of the smallest set A ⊆ S such that x is not in the convex-hull of S \A.
Claim 2.19 (Yaglom and Boltyanskiıˇ [1961], Edelsbrunner [1987]). Let S ⊂ Rd be a multiset of points. There
exists x ∈ Rd such that td(x) ≥ |S |/(d +1).
Thus, a centerpoint always exists and a Tukey median must be a centerpoint. However, not every
centerpoint is a Tukey median. We will use the following regarding the set of points of all points whose
Tukey depth is at least r.
Fact 2.20 (see e.g. Liu et al. [2014]). Let S ⊆ Rd be a multiset of points and r > 0. Define T (r) = {x ∈ Rd :
td(x) ≥ r}. Then T (r) is a polytope whose faces are supported by affine subspaces that are spanned by points
from S.
So, for example the set of all Tukey medians is a polytope and if it is d-dimensional then each of its facet
is supported by a hyperplane that passes through d +1 points from S.
3 Finding a Point in the Convex Hull
Our goal is to privately find a point in the convex hull of a set of input points (i.e., the database). We will
actually achieve a stronger task and find a point whose Tukey depth is at least |S |/2(d + 1) (provided that
|S | is large enough). Observe that x is in the convex hull of S if and only if td(x) > 0. As we mentioned
in the introduction, finding a point whose Tukey depth is high results in a better learning algorithms for
halfspaces.
The idea of our algorithm is to find the point x = (x1, . . . ,xd ) coordinate after coordinate: we useARecConcave
to find a value x∗1 that can be extended by some x2, . . . ,xd so that the depth of (x
∗
1,x2 . . . ,xd ) is close to the
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depth of the Tukey median, then we find a value x∗2 so that there is a point (x
∗
1,x
∗
2,x3 . . . ,xd ) whose depth
is close to the depth of the Tukey median, and so forth until we find all coordinates. The parameters in
ARecConcave are set such that in each step we lose depth of at most n/2(d+1)2 compared to the Tukeymedian,
resulting in a point (x∗1, . . . ,x
∗
d ) whose depth is at most n/2(d + 1) less than the depth of the Tukey median,
i.e., its depth is at least n/2(d +1).
3.1 Defining a Quasi-Concave Function
To apply the above approach, we need to prove that the functions considered in the algorithm ARecConcave
are quasi-concave.
Definition 3.1. For every 1 ≤ i ≤ d and every x∗1, . . . ,x∗i−1 ∈ R, define
Qx∗1 ,...,x
∗
i−1 (xi ) , maxxi+1,...,xd∈R
td(x∗1, . . . ,x
∗
i−1,xi , . . . ,xd ).
We next prove that Qx∗1,...,x
∗
i−1 (xi ) is quasi-concave. Towards this goal, we first prove that the func-
tion ta1,...,ad (w), defined in Equation (3), is quasi-concave.
Claim 3.2. For every a1, . . . ,ad ∈ R, the function ta1,...,ad (w) is quasi-concave.
Proof. Define f1(w) =
∣∣∣{(y1, . . . ,yd ) ∈ S : ∑di=1 aiyi ≥ w}∣∣∣, and f2(w) = ∣∣∣{(y1, . . . ,yd ) ∈ S : ∑di=1 aiyi ≤ w}∣∣∣. Note
that ta1,...,ad (w) = min{f1(w), f2(w)}. These functions count the number of points in S on the two (closed)
sides of the hyperplane hpa1...ad ,w. The claim follows by Claim 2.12 since both f1, f2 are quasi-concave (in
fact, both are monotone).
We next prove that the restriction of the Tukey depth function to a line is quasi-concave. This lemma
is implied by Fact 2.20 (implying that the set of points whose Tukey depth is at least r is convex). For
completeness, we supply a full proof of the claim.
Claim 3.3. Fix α1, . . . ,αd ,β1, . . . ,βd ∈ R, and define tdlα1 ,...,αd ,β1 ,...,βd (t) = td(α1t + β1, . . . ,αd t + βd ). The function
tdlα1,...,αd ,β1,...,βd is quasi-concave.
Proof. Let t0 < t1 < t2 and let (a1, . . . ,ad ) be a direction that minimizes td(α1t1 + β1, . . . ,αd t1 + βd ) in (4), i.e.,
tdlα1,...,αd ,β1,...,βd (t1) = td(α1t1 + β1, . . . ,αd t1 + βd ) = ta1,...,ad
(∑d
i=1 ai(αi t1 + βi )
)
. Consider the function which
maps t to
∑d
i=1 ai(αi t + βi ) = (
∑d
i=1 aiαi )t +
∑d
i=1 aiβi . This function is either increasing or decreasing, thus,
by Claim 3.2,
tdlα1,...,αd ,β1,...,βd (t1) = ta1,...,ad

d∑
i=1
ai(αi t1 + βi )

≥ min
ta1,...,ad

d∑
i=1
ai(αi t0 + βi )
 , ta1 ,...,ad

d∑
i=1
ai(αi t2 + βi )


≥ min {td(α1t0 + β1, . . . ,αd t0 + βd ),td(α1t2 + β1, . . . ,αd t2 + βd )}
= min
{
tdlα1,...,αd ,β1,...,βd (t0),tdlα1 ,...,αd ,β1 ,...,βd (t1)
}
.
Lemma 3.4. For every 1 ≤ i ≤ d and every x∗1, . . . ,x∗i−1 ∈ R, the functionQx∗1,...,x∗i−1 (xi ) is a quasi-concave function.
Furthermore, Qx∗1,...,x
∗
i−1 (xi ) is a sensitivity 1 function of the multiset S.
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Proof. Let x0i ,x
1
i ,x
2
i such that x
0
i < x
1
i < x
2
i . Furthermore, let x
0
i+1, . . . ,x
0
d and x
2
i+1, . . . ,x
2
d be points maximiz-
ing the functions td(x∗1, . . . ,x
∗
i−1,x
0
i , ·, . . . , ·) and td(x∗1, . . . ,x∗i−1,x2i , ·, . . . , ·) respectively, that is, Qx∗1,...,x∗i−1 (xbi ) =
td(x∗1, . . . ,x
∗
i−1,x
b
i ,x
b
i+1, . . . ,x
b
d ) for b ∈ {0,2}.
Consider the line L : R → Rd passing through the points (x∗1, . . . ,x∗i−1,xbi ,xbi+1, . . . ,xbd ) for b ∈ {0,2}, and
scale its parameter such that L(xbi ) = (x
∗
1, . . . ,x
∗
i−1,x
b
i ,x
b
i+1, . . . ,x
b
d ). In particular, for every x ∈ R the i’th
coordinate in L(x) is x. By Claim 3.3 and the definition of Qx∗1 ,...,x
∗
i−1 ,
Qx∗1,...,x
∗
i−1 (x
1
i ) ≥ td(L(x1i )) ≥min
{
td(L(x0i )),td(L(x
2
i ))
}
=
{
Qx∗1 ,...,x
∗
i−1 (x
0
i ),Qx∗1 ,...,x
∗
i−1 (x
2
i )
}
.
The fact that Qx∗1,...,x
∗
i−1 has sensitivity 1 is implied by Observation 2.16 and the fact that maximum of
sensitivity 1 functions is a sensitivity 1 function.
3.2 Extending the Domain
The input to the private algorithm for finding a point in the convex hull is a dataset of points S ⊆ X, where
X is a finite set whose size is at most T . We note that the dataset S may contain several copies of the same
point (i.e. it is a multiset). By the results of Bun et al. [2015], the restriction to subsets of a finite set X is
essential (even when d = 1).
Notice that a Tukey median of S might not be a point in X. Furthermore, the proof that the functions
Qx∗1,...,x
∗
i−1 are quasi-concave is over the reals. Therefore, we extend the domain to X˜ =
∏d
i=1 X˜i such that
for every dataset S the functions Qx∗1,...,x
∗
i−1 attain their maximum over the extended domain. We will not
try to optimize the size of X˜1, . . . , X˜d as the dependency of the sample complexity of ARecConcave on |X˜i |
is 2O(log
∗ |X˜i |).
Claim 3.5. There exists sets X˜1, . . . , X˜d such that |X˜i | ≤ (dT d2(d+1))2d for 1 ≤ i ≤ d and for every dataset S, for
every 1 ≤ i ≤ d, and for every x∗1, . . . ,x∗i−1 ∈ X˜1 × · · · × ˜Xi−1, there exist xmi , . . . ,xmd ∈ X˜i × . . .× X˜d such that
max
xi+1,...,xd∈R
td(x∗1, . . . ,x
∗
i−1,xi , . . . ,xd ) = td(x
∗
1, . . . ,x
∗
i−1,x
m
i , . . . ,x
m
d ). (5)
Proof. For 1 ≤ i ≤ d, let Xi be the projection of X to the ith coordinate, that is,
Xi =
{
x : ∃x1 ,...,xi−1 ,xi+1 ,...,xd (x1, . . . ,xi−1,x,xi+1 , . . . ,xd ) ∈ X
}
.
The construction heavily exploits Fact 2.20. Let L denote the set of all affine subspaces that are spanned
by points in X1 × · · · ×Xd . Since each such subspace is spanned by at most d +1 points, it follows that |L| ≤( T d
d+1
) ≤ T d(d+1). By Fact 2.20, for every dataset S and every r > 0, every vertex of T (r) can be written as the
intersection of at most d subspaces in L. In particular, there exists a Tukey median that is the intersection
of at most d subspaces in L.
We construct the sets in iterations where we start with X˜j = ∅ for every 1 ≤ j ≤ d. In iteration i we do
the following: for every x∗1, . . . ,x
∗
i−1 ∈ X˜1 × · · ·× X˜i−1 and for every d − i subspaces in L such that there exists a
unique point x = (x∗1 . . . x
∗
i−1,xi . . . ,xd ) in the intersection of these d − i subspaces, we add xj to X˜j for all j ≥ i.
We next argue that item (ii) in the conclusion of the claim is satisfied: indeed, by Fact 2.20, this con-
struction contains a vertex of every set of the form T (r)∩ {x ∈ Rd : x1 = x∗1, . . . xi−1 = x∗i−1}, for every r > 0,
i ≤ d, and every (x∗1, . . . ,x∗i−1) ∈ X˜1 × . . .× X˜i−1. In particular, by plugging
r = max
xi+1 ,...,xd∈R
td(x∗1, . . . ,x
∗
i−1,xi , . . . ,xd ),
it contains a point which satisfies Equation (5). This implies item (ii).
As for item (i), note that the size of X˜1 is at most
(|L|
d
) ≤ T d2(d+1). Similarly, for i > 1:
|X˜i | ≤
(|L|
d
)
+
( |L|
d − 1
)
|X˜1|+ . . .+
( |L|
d − i
) i−1∏
j=1
|X˜j | ≤
(
d ·
(|L|
d
))2d
≤ (dT d2(d+1))2d .
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3.3 The Algorithm
In Figure 1, we present an (ε,δ)-differentially private algorithmAFindTukey that with probability at least 1−β
finds a point whose Tukey depth is at least n/2(d +1). The informal description of the algorithm appears in
the beginning of Section 3.
Algorithm AFindTukey
Preprocessing:
• Construct the sets X˜1, . . . , X˜d as in Claim 3.5. Let T˜ =max1≤i≤d |X˜i |.
(∗ By Claim 3.5, log∗ T˜ = log∗ d + log∗T +O(1). ∗)
Algorithm:
(i) Let β,ε,δ be the utility/privacy parameters, and S be an input database from X.
(ii) For i = 1 to d do:
(a) For every xi ∈ X˜i define
Qx∗1 ,...,x
∗
i−1 (xi ) , maxxi+1∈X˜i+1,...,xd∈X˜d
td(x∗1, . . . ,x
∗
i−1,xi , . . . ,xd ).
(b) Execute ARecConcave on S with the function Qx∗1,...,x∗i−1 and parameters r =
n
d+1 −
(i−1)n
d(d+1) , α0 =
1
2d ,β0 =
β
d ,ε0 =
ε
2
√
2d ln(2/δ)
,δ0 =
δ
2d . Let x
∗
i be its output.
(iii) Return x∗1, . . . ,x
∗
d .
Figure 1: Algorithm AFindTukey for finding a point whose Tukey depth is at least n/2(d +1).
Theorem 3.6. Let ε ≤ 1 and δ < 1/2 and X ⊂ Rd be a set of size at most T . Assume that the input dataset S ⊆ X
satisfies
|S | =O
d2.5 · 2O(log∗ T+log∗ d) log
0.5
(
1
δ
)
log
(
d2
βδ
)
ε
.
Then, AFindTukey is an (ε,δ)-differentially private algorithm that with probability at least 1 − β returns a point
x∗1, . . . ,x
∗
d such that td(x
∗
1, . . . ,x
∗
d ) ≥ |S |2(d+1) .
Proof. The proof of the correctness (utility) of AFindTukey is proved by induction, using the correctness of
ARecConcave. The privacy proof follows from the privacy ofARecConcave and using the advanced composition
theorem (Theorem 2.4).
Utility. We prove by induction that after step i of the algorithm, with probability at least 1 − iβ/d, the
returned values x∗1, . . . ,x
∗
i satisfy Qx∗1,...,x
∗
i−1 (x
∗
i ) ≥ |S |d+1 (1− i2d ), i.e., there are (xi+1, . . . ,xd ) ∈ X˜i+1 × · · · × X˜d such
that td(x∗1, . . . ,x
∗
i ,xi+1, . . . ,xd ) ≥ |S |d+1 (1− i2d ).
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The basis is the induction is i = 0: by Claim 2.19 the Tukey median has depth at least |S |/(d +1) and by
Claim 3.5, the median is in X˜1 × · · · × X˜d . Thus, with probability 1 there are (x1, . . . ,xd ) ∈ X˜1 × · · · × X˜d such
that td(x1, . . . ,xd ) ≥ |S |d+1 .
Next, by the induction hypothesis for i − 1, with probability at least 1− (i − 1)β/d it holds that
max
x∈X˜i
{Qx∗1,...,x∗i−1 (x)} ≥
|S |
d +1
− (i − 1)|S |
2d(d +1)
= r >
|S |
2(d +1)
≥ 8log∗ T˜ · 12log
∗ T˜
α0ε0
log
(
192(log∗T )2
β0δ0
)
.
Therefore, by Proposition 2.11, with probability at least (1 − β/d)
(
1 − (i − 1)β/d
)
≥ 1 − iβ/d Algorithm
ARecConcave returns x∗i ∈ X˜i such that
Qx∗1 ,...,x
∗
i−1 (x
∗
i ) ≥ (1−α)r =
(
1− 1
2d
) |S |
d +1
(
1− i − 1
2d
)
>
|S |
d +1
(
1− i
2d
)
.
To conclude, after d steps of the algorithm, td(x∗1, . . . ,x
∗
d ) ≥ |S |2(d+1) with probability at least 1− β.
Privacy. By Proposition 2.11, each invocation of ARecConcave is (ε0,δ0)-differentially private. AFindTukey
invokes ARecConcave d times. Thus, by Theorem 2.4 (the advanced composition) with δ′ = δ/2, it follows
that AFindTukey is ( ε2 + ε
2
4ln(2/δ) ,δ) differentially-private, which implies (ε,δ)-privacy whenever ε ≤ 1 and δ ≤
1/2.
4 Learning Halfspaces Using Convex Hull
We describe in Figure 2 a reduction from learning halfspaces to finding a point in a convex-hull of a multi-
set of points. Furthermore, we show that if the algorithm we use in the reduction finds a point whose Tukey
depth is high (as our algorithm from Section 3 does), then the required sample complexity of the learning
algorithm is reduced. As a result, we get an upper bound of O˜(d4.52log
∗ |X |) on the sample complexity of
private learning halfspaces (ignoring the privacy and learning parameters). In comparison, using the expo-
nential mechanism ofMcSherry and Talwar [2007] results in an (ε,δ)-deferentially private algorithmwhose
sample complexity is O(d log |X |), e.g., for the interesting case where X = [T ]d for some T , the complexity is
O(d2 logT ). Our upper bound is better than the sample complexity of the exponential mechanism when d
is small compared to log |T |, in particular when d is constant.
We start by showing the existence of a set H that is used by the algorithm. We say that a vector
(a1, . . . ,ad ,w) ∈ Rd+1 represents a halfspace hs ∈ HALFSPACE(X) if hs(x) = hsa1,...,ad ,w(x) for every x ∈ X. Note
that every hs ∈ HALFSPACE(X) has many representations.
Claim 4.1. There exists a set H ⊆ Rd+1, where |H | ≤ 2|X |d+1 which contains one representation of each halfspace
hs ∈ HALFSPACE(X).
Proof. By standard bounds from discrete geometry, |HALFSPACE(X)| ≤ 2|X |d+1 (see, e.g. Ga¨rtner and Welzl
[1994]). For each hs ∈ HALFSPACE(X) pick a representation (a1 . . . ad ,w) ∈ Rd+1.
Theorem 4.2. Assume that Algorithm A used in step 4 of Algorithm ALearnHalfSpace is an (ε,δ)-differentialy
private algorithm that finds with probability at least 1 − β a point in a convex hull for a multisets S ⊆ X ⊂ Rd
whose Tukey depth is at least r provided that |S | ≥m(d, |X |,ε,δ,β) for some function m(·, ·, ·, ·, ·).
Let ε ≤ 1,δ ≤ 12 and α,β ≤ 1 be the privacy and utility parameters. Then, ALearnHalfSpace is an (ε,δ)-
differentially private (α,β)-PAC learner with sample complexity s for the class HALFSPACE(X) for
s =O
(m2 · d log( mrα ) + log(m/β)
rα
)
where m =m(d +1,2|X |d+1,ε,δ,β/2).
Proof. Wefirst establish the privacy guarantee of the algorithm and later argue that it PAC-learns HALFSPACE(X).
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Algorithm ALearnHalfSpace
Preprocessing:
• Fix a set H ⊆ Rd+1 that contains representations of all halfspaces in HALFSPACE(X), as in
Claim 4.1.
Algorithm:
1. Let ε,δ,α,β be the privacy and utility parameters and let S be a realizable input sample of size s,
where s is as in Theorem 4.2.
2. Partition S into m equisized subsamples S1, . . . ,Sm, where m = m(d + 1,2|X |d+1,ε,δ,β/2) as in
Theorem 4.2.
(∗ Note that each Si has size Θ
( d log( mrα )+log(2m/β)
rα/m
)
. ∗)
3. For each Si pick a consistent halfpace hi ∈H uniformly at random.
4. Apply an (ε,δ)-differentially private algorithm A for finding a point in a convex hull with pa-
rameters ε,δ,
β
2 on H0 = (h1 . . . hm).
5. Output the halfspace h found by A.
Figure 2: A reduction from learning halfspaces to finding a point in a convex hull.
Privacy. Let S1,S2 be two neighboring input samples of size at least s, where s is as in the theorem state-
ment. Let H0(S
1),H0(S
2) denote the list of halfspaces that are derived in step 2 of the algorithm when
it is applied on S1,S2. Since the hi ’s are constructed from mutually disjoint subsamples it follows that
the datasets H0(S1) and H0(S2) are neighbors. The (ε,δ)-privacy guarantee now follows from the privacy
gurantee of A since the size of the H0(S i )’s is m =m(d +1,2|X |d+1,ε,δ,β/2).
Utility. We next establish that the algorithm learns HALFSPACE(X) with confidence 1 − β and error α.
Let D denote the target distribution and c ∈ HALFSPACE(X) denote the target concept. Let S denote the
input sample of size at least s that is sampled independently from D and labeled by c.
We first claim that every halfspace hi ∈ H0 the probability hi has error greater than rαm with respect
to the distribution D is at most β/2m. This follows directly from standard bounds on the (non-private)
sample complexity of PAC learning of VC classes, since the VC dimension of HALFSPACE(X) is at most
d + 1 and since each Si has size Ω(
d log(1/α′)+log(1/β′)
α′ ) where α
′ = rαm and β
′ = β2m (see e.g. Theorem 6.8
in Shalev-Shwartz and Ben-David [2014]).
We next claim that if h ∈ Rd+1 errs on a point x = (x1, . . . ,xd ) then at least r halfspaces in H0 err on x. By
the assumption in the theorem,A outputs with probability at least 1−β/2 a halfspace h whose Tukey depth
is at least r with respect to H0. By duality, the set of all halfspaces that err on x is itself a halfspace in R
d+1
that contains all points (a1, . . . ,ad ,w) ∈ Rd such that sign(
∑d
i=1 xiai −w) , c(x). Denote this halfspace by herr.
By assumption, h ∈ herr. Thus, since the Tukey Depth of h with respect to H0 is at least r, at least r of the
halfspaces in H0 are in herr, as required.
We are ready to establish the PAC-learning guarantee. Assume that errorD(c,hi ) ≤ rα/m for every 1 ≤
i ≤ m and that A returns a point whose Tukey rank is at most r. By the argument above and the union
bound, this happens with probability at least 1 − β. Let Eh : X → {0,1} denote the indicator the h errs (i.e.
Eh(x) = 1 if and only if h(x) , c(x)). Similarly, let Ehi denote the indicator that hi ∈H0 errs. For every x ∈ X:
Eh(x) ≤ 1r
∑m
i=1Ehi (x) (either Eh(x) = 0 or Eh(x) = 1 and
∑m
i=1Ehi (x) ≥ r). Therefore, by taking expectation over
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both sides it follows that with probability at least 1− β: errorD(c,h) = Ex∼D[Eh(x)] ≤ Ex∼D
[
1
r
∑m
i=1Ehi (x)
]
=
1
r
∑m
i=1 errorD(c,hi ) ≤ mr · (rα/m) = α, as required.
Using AFindTukey in step 4 of Algorithm ALearnHalfSpace, we get the following corollary (which follows
from Theorem 3.6 and Theorem 4.2).
Corollary 4.3. Let ε ≤ 1, δ < 1/2, and X ⊆ Rd be a set. There exists an (ε,δ)-differentially private (α,β)-PAC
learner with sample complexity s for HALFSPACE(X) with
s = O˜
(d4.52O(log∗ |X |+log∗ d) log1.5 1δ log2 1β
εα
)
.
Corollary 4.3 establishes an upper bound on the sample complexity of privately learning halfspaces
whose dependency on the domain size |X | is 2O log∗(|X |). The crux of the algorithm is a reduction to privately
publishing a point with a large Tukey depth with respect to a given input dataset. A drawback of this
approach is that the latter task is likely to be computationally difficult (even without privacy constraints),
unless the dimension d is constant (see Miller and Sheehy [2010] and references within).
In ALearnHalfSpace we can use an algorithm A that finds a point in the convex hull (i.e., a point whose
Tukey depth is at least 1). The resulting learning algorithm require sample complexity ofO(
m2·d log(mα )+log(m/β)
α ),
where m is the sample complexity of A. This may result in a more efficient private learning algorithm for
halfspaces as the task of privately finding a point in the convex hull might be easier than the task of pri-
vately finding a point with high Tukey degree. Furthermore, in this case, we can use an algorithm that
privately finds a hypothesis that is a linear combination with positive coefficients of the hypotheses in H0.
This follows from the observation that if all hypotheses in H0 are correct on a point x, then any linear
combination with positive coefficients of the hypotheses in H0 is correct of x.
5 A Lower Bound on the Sample Complexity of Privately Finding a
Point in the Convex Hull
In this section we show a lower bound on the sample complexity of privately finding a point in the convex
hull of a database S ⊆ X = [T ]d . We show that any (ε,δ)-differentially private algorithm for this task must
have sample complexity Ω(dε log
1
δ ). Our lower bound actually applies to a possibly simpler task of finding
a non-trivial linear combination of the points in the database.
By Bun et al. [2015], finding a point in the convex hull (even for d = 1) requires sample complexity
Ω(log∗T ). Thus, together we get a lower bound on the sample complexity ofΩ(dε log
1
δ + log
∗T ).
It may be tempting to guess that, even with pure (ε,0)-differential privacy, a sample complexity of
O(log |X |) = O(d logT ) should suffice for solving this task, as the size of the output space is T d , because
S ⊆ [T ]d , and hence (it seems) that one could privately solve this problem using the exponential mechanism
of McSherry and Talwar [2007] with sample complexity that depends logarithmically on the size of the
output space. We show that this is not the case, and that any (ε,0)-differentially private algorithm for this
task must have sample complexity Ω(d
2
ε logT ).
Theorem 5.1. Let T ≥ 2, and d ≥ 10. Let A be an (ε,δ)-differentially private algorithm that takes a database
S ⊆ [T ]d of size m and returns, with probability at least 1/2, a non-trivial linear combination of the points in S.
Then,
m =Ω
(
min
{
d2
ε
logT ,
d
ε
log
1
δ
})
.
The proof of Theorem 5.1 builds on the analysis of Blum et al. [2008] for lower bounding the sample
complexity of releasing approximated answers for counting queries.
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Proof. Throughout this proof, we use span(S) to denote the set of all non-trivial linear combinations of
the points in S. Let I = {x1,x2, . . . ,xd/2,x′} be a multiset of random points, where each point is chosen
independently and uniformly from [T ]d . Also let i be chosen uniformly from {1,2, . . . ,d/2}. Now define the
database S containing 2md copies of each of x1, . . . ,xd/2 and define the database S
′ containing 2md copies of
each of x1, . . . ,xi−1,xi+1, . . .xd/2,x′. Note that S,S ′ differ in exactly 2md points.
Observe that the points in I are linearly independent with high probability. To see this note that any set
V of size at most d2 spans at most T
d/2 vectors in [T ]d : indeed, without loss of generality we may assume
that V is independent and therefore can be completed to a basis Rd by adding d − |V | ≥ d/2 unit vectors
(since the dimension of V is at most d/2 there is at least one unit vector that it does not span, add this vector
to V and continue). Without loss of generality, these unit vectors are e1, . . . ,ed/2. Thus, every choice from
[T ]d/2 for the last d/2 coordinates can be completed in a most one way to a vector spanned by V (because
every element of Rd may be written in a unique way as a linear combination of elements of the resulting
basis). This means that a set of (at most) d/2 points spans at most T d/2 vectors in [T ]d . Hence, by a union
bound, the probability that the points in I are not independent is at most d2 ·T −d/2.
Let B(b, I) be a procedure that operates on a point b and a set of points I , defined as follows. If I is
not linearly independent, or if b < span(I), than the procedure outputs ⊥. Otherwise the procedure returns
the point x ∈ I with the largest coefficient when representing b as a linear combination of the points in I
(ties are broken arbitrarily). Observe that if b ∈ span(S) for a subset S ⊆ I and if the points in I are linearly
independent then B(b, I) ∈ S. Let β denote the probability that A(S) fails to return a point in span(S). As i
is uniform on {1,2, . . . ,d/2} we have
Pr
I ,i,A
[B(A(S), I) = xi] ≥ Pr
I ,A
[
I is independent,
A(S) ∈ span(S)
]
· Pr
I ,i,A
[
B(A(S), I) = xi
∣∣∣∣∣ I is independent,A(S) ∈ span(S)
]
≥
(
1− β − d
2
·T −d/2
)
· 2
d
≥ 1
2d
,
where the second inequality is implied by the fact that i is chosen with uniform distribution from a set of
size d/2 and the last inequality is by asserting that β ≤ 1/2, T ≥ 2, and d ≥ 10.
On the other hand observe that if B(A(S ′), I) = xi then (1)A(S ′) ∈ span(I), as otherwise B outputs⊥, (2) I
is linearly independent, as otherwise B outputs ⊥, and (3) A(S ′) < span(I \ {xi}), as otherwise the coefficient
of xi in A(S ′) is 0, and B will not output xi.
Let I−i = I \ {xi}= {x1, . . . ,xi−1,xi+1, . . . ,xd/2,x′} and b←A(S ′). We have that
Pr
I ,i,A
[B(b, I) = xi] ≤ Pr
I ,i,A
[b ∈ span(I) and b < span(I−i ) and I is independent]
≤ Pr
I ,i,A
[xi ∈ span(I−i ∪ {b})] ≤ T −d/2,
where the last inequality is because xi is independent of I−i and b (recall that we denoted b←A(S ′), and
hence, b is a (random) function of I−i , which is independent of xi). Therefore, by the privacy guarantees of
A we get
1
2d
≤ Pr
I ,i,A
[B(A(S), I) = xi] =
∑
I ,i
Pr[I , i] ·Pr
A
[B(A(S), I) = xi]
≤
∑
I ,i
Pr[I , i] ·
(
e2εm/d ·Pr
A
[B(A(S ′), I) = xi] + e2εm/d · 2δm/d
)
= e2εm/d · Pr
I ,i,A
[B(A(S ′), I) = xi] + e2εm/d · 2δm/d
≤ e2εm/d ·T −d/2 + e2εm/d · 2δm/d.
Solving for m, this means that m =Ω(min{ d2ε logT , dε log 1δ }.
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